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Establishing Causal Claims in Medicine
Jon Williamson
Centre for Reasoning, University of Kent
ABSTRACT
Russo and Williamson [2007. “Interpreting Causality in the Health
Sciences.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21:
157–170] put forward the following thesis: in order to establish
a causal claim in medicine, one normally needs to establish
both that the putative cause and putative eﬀect are
appropriately correlated and that there is some underlying
mechanism that can account for this correlation. I argue that,
although the Russo–Williamson thesis conﬂicts with the tenets of
present-day evidence-based medicine (EBM), it oﬀers a better
causal epistemology than that provided by present-day EBM
because it better explains two key aspects of causal discovery.
First, the thesis better explains the role of clinical studies in
establishing causal claims. Second, it yields a better account of
extrapolation.
1. An Epistemological Thesis
Russo and Williamson (2007, §§1–4) put forward an epistemological thesis that can be
phrased as follows:
In order to establish a causal claim in medicine one normally needs to establish two things:
ﬁrst, that the putative cause and eﬀect are appropriately correlated; second, that there is some
mechanism which explains instances of the putative eﬀect in terms of the putative cause and
which can account for this correlation.
This epistemological thesis, which has become known in the literature as the Russo–
Williamson thesis or RWT, has generated some controversy—see, e.g. Weber (2007,
2009), Broadbent (2011), Campaner (2011), Clarke (2011), Darby and Williamson
(2011), Gillies (2011), Illari (2011), Howick (2011a, 2011b), Russo and Williamson
(2011a, 2011b), Campaner and Galavotti (2012), Claveau (2012), Dragulinescu (2012),
Clarke et al. (2013, 2014) and Fiorentino and Dammann (2015). The aim of this
section is to explain what the thesis says, why it is true, and why it is controversial. In
section 2, I argue that an approach to medical methodology based on RWT fares better
than present-day evidence-based medicine (EBM) in explaining three basic facts about
how clinical studies (CSs) can be used to establish causal claims in medicine. In section
3, I argue that RWT motivates a better account of extrapolation inferences too.
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1.1. What the Thesis Says
First, let us clarify what the thesis says. This is important because RWT has occasionally
been misinterpreted, particularly with respect to the following point.
RWT requires establishing the existence of a correlation and the existence of a mechan-
ism, not the extent of the correlation, nor the details of the mechanism. In some cases, of
course, establishing the extent of a correlation is a means to establishing its existence, and
establishing the details of a mechanism is a means to establishing its existence, but these
means are not the only means. We shall return to this point in section 2.
The second general point to make is that RWT is a purely epistemological thesis, con-
cerning the establishing of causal relationships. Russo and Williamson (2007) used the
thesis to argue for a particular metaphysical account of causality—the epistemic theory
of causality—but RWT itself does not say anything directly about the nature of causality.
The thesis is intended to be both descriptive and normative: i.e. as capturing typical past
cases of establishing causality in medicine (e.g. Clarke 2011; Gillies 2011), as well as char-
acterising the logic of establishing causality.
Let us now clarify some of the terms that occur within the statement of the thesis.
1.1.1. Medicine
Here ‘medicine’ is to be construed broadly to include the health sciences as well as practical
medicine. Causal claims of interest to medicine include claims about the eﬀectiveness of
drugs, medical devices and public health interventions, and claims about harms
induced by such interventions or by pathogens or environmental exposures, for
example. Henceforth, we will primarily be interested in generic claims (repeatably instan-
tiatable or ‘type-level’ claims, such as the claim that taking aspirin relieves headache), but
RWT may be taken to apply also to single-case claims (‘token-level’ claims, such as the
claim that Bob’s taking aspirin this morning relieved his headache).
1.1.2. Mechanism
In the statement of RWT above, ‘mechanism’ can be understood broadly as referring to a
complex-systems mechanism, a mechanistic process, or some combination of the two. A
complex-systems mechanism consists of entities and activities organised in such a way that
they are responsible for some phenomenon to be explained (Machamer, Darden, and
Craver 2000; Illari and Williamson 2012). An example is the mechanism by which the
heart pumps blood. A mechanistic process is a spatio-temporally contiguous process
along which a signal is propagated (Reichenbach 1956; Salmon 1998). An example is an
artiﬁcial pacemaker’s electrical signal being transmitted along a lead from the pacemaker
itself to the appropriate part of the heart. A mechanism might also be composed of both
these sorts of mechanisms: for example, the complex-systems mechanism of the artiﬁcial
pacemaker, the complex-systems mechanism by which the heart pumps the blood and the
mechanistic process linking the two.
Note that a mechanism cannot in general be thought of simply as a causal network. A
causal network can be represented by a directed graph whose nodes represent events or
variables and where there is an arrow from one node to another if the former is a
direct cause of the latter. On the other hand, a mechanism is typically represented by a
richer diagram, such as is frequently found in textbooks and research articles in medicine.
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Figure 1, for instance, exempliﬁes the fact that organisation tends to play a crucial expla-
natory role in a mechanism. Organisation includes both spatio-temporal structure and the
hierarchical structure of the diﬀerent levels of the mechanism.1
Note also that high-quality evidence of mechanism can be obtained by a wide variety of
means. Table 1 provides some examples.
1.1.3. Establishing
A causal claim is ‘established’ just when standards are met for treating the claim itself as
evidence, to be used to help evaluate further claims. This requires not only high conﬁdence
in the truth of the claim itself but also high conﬁdence in its stability, i.e. that further evi-
dence will not call the claim into question.
Figure 1. T cell eﬀector mechanisms in a lung infected by inﬂuenza A virus (Gruta and Turner 2014).
Table 1. Examples of sources of evidence of mechanisms in medicine (Clarke et al. 2014).
Direct manipulation: e.g. in vitro experiments
Direct observation: e.g. biomedical imaging, autopsy
Clinical studies: e.g. RCTs, cohort studies, case control studies, case series
Conﬁrmed theory: e.g. established immunological theory
Analogy: e.g. animal experiments
Simulation: e.g. agent-based models
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That establishing a proposition gives rise to evidence tells us something about establish-
ing, but leaves open the question of what constitutes evidence. Evidence has variously been
analysed as one’s knowledge, or one’s full beliefs, or those of one’s degrees of belief which
are set by observation, or one’s information, or what one rationally grants (Williamson
2015). We need not settle the question of what constitutes evidence here. It is worth
noting, though, that on some of these accounts evidence must be true, while others
admit the possibility that some items of evidence are false. This has consequences for
whether establishing is factive. For example, if, as argued by Williamson (2015), one’s evi-
dence consists of the propositions that one rationally grants, then establishing a claim does
not guarantee its truth, because not everything that one rationally grants need be true.
That establishing is not factive is suggested by apparently true assertions such as,
‘Certain researchers had established that stress is the principal cause of stomach ulcers,
but further investigations showed that it is not’. (One cannot substitute ‘knew’ for ‘had
established’ in this sentence, because knowledge implies truth; one would need ‘thought
they knew’ instead.)
Whether or not establishing is factive, it requires meeting a high epistemological stan-
dard. In particular, establishing a causal claim should be distinguished from acting in
accord with a causal claim as a precautionary measure: in certain cases in which a pro-
posed health action has a relatively low cost, or failing to treat has a high cost, it may
be appropriate to initiate the action even when its eﬀectiveness has not been established,
so that beneﬁts can be reaped in case it turns out to be eﬀective.
1.1.4. Correlation
The epistemological thesis says that one needs to establish that the putative cause and
eﬀect are ‘appropriately correlated’. Here ‘appropriately correlated’ just means probabilis-
tically dependent conditional on potential confounders, where the probability distribution
in question is relative to a speciﬁed population or reference class of individuals.2 Thus, if A
is the putative cause variable, B the putative eﬀect variable and C is the set of potential
confounder variables, one needs to establish that A and B are probabilistically dependent
conditional on C, often written A⊥/ B | C. A confounder is a variable correlated with both
A and B, e.g. a common cause of A and B (Figure 2). The dependence needs to be estab-
lished conditional on confounders because otherwise an observed correlation between
A and B might be attributable to their correlation with C, rather than attributable to
Figure 2. Common cause C is a potential confounder.
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A being a cause of B. The set of potential confounders should include any variable that
plausibly might be a confounder, given the available evidence of the area in question.
Establishing correlation is non-trivial for two reasons. First, because it requires estab-
lishing a probabilistic dependence in the data-generating distribution, rather than simply
in the distribution of a sample of observed outcomes. The method of sampling and size of
sample can conspire to render an observed sample correlation a poor estimate of a corre-
lation in the population at large. Second, establishing correlation requires considering all
potential confounders, and there can be very many of these.
To be clear, we shall use ‘observed correlation’ to refer to a correlation found in the
data, ‘genuine correlation’ to refer to a correlation in the population from which the
data are drawn, and ‘established correlation’ to refer to a claimed genuine correlation
that has met the standards required for being considered established. If establishing is fal-
lible, that a correlation is established does not guarantee that there is a genuine correlation,
though it makes it very likely. Moreover, to establish a correlation between A and B, it is
not necessary that every relevant dataset yields an observed correlation between A and B,
although some observed correlation would typically be required.
1.1.5. Qualiﬁcations
RWT says that one ‘normally’ needs to establish both correlation and mechanism. This is
because there are certain cases in which causality is apparently not accompanied by a cor-
relation and there are also cases in which causality is apparently not accompanied by an
underlying mechanism. If this is so, one cannot expect to establish both correlation and
mechanism in these cases.
In cases of overdetermination, where the cause does not raise the probability of the
eﬀect because the eﬀect will happen anyway, there is no actual correlation between the
cause and the eﬀect. In many such cases, one can expect a counterfactual correlation: if
things had been diﬀerent in such a way that the eﬀect would not have happened
anyway—e.g. had a second, overdetermining cause been eliminated—then the cause
and eﬀect would indeed be correlated. One might think, then, that one ought to be able
to establish a counterfactual correlation for any causal claim, if not an actual correlation.
However, there are cases in which the cause of interest and a second, overdetermining
cause are mutually exclusive, so that it is not possible both to eliminate the second
cause and allow the ﬁrst cause to vary so as to establish a correlation. For example, an
unstable atom may decay to one of two mutually exclusive intermediary states, B and
B′, on the way to a ground state C; attaining either one of the intermediary states
causes the particle to reach the ground state, even though there may well be no correlation,
P(C |B) = P(C |B′) = P(C); here one cannot eliminate B′ and vary B (see Williamson
2009, §10). Therefore, even the demand for a counterfactual correlation may be too strong.
Let us turn next to causality without mechanisms. Where the cause and/or the eﬀect is
an absence, it cannot be connected by an actual mechanism. In many such cases, one can
expect a counterfactualmechanism. Suppose cause and eﬀect are both absences: e.g. failing
to treat causes a lack of a heartbeat. If things had been diﬀerent in such a way that what was
absent in the cause were present (e.g. the treatment is administered), then one would
expect a mechanism from this presence to a presence corresponding to the eﬀect (e.g. a
heartbeat). One might think, then, that one ought to be able to establish the existence
of a counterfactual mechanism for any causal claim, if not an actual mechanism.
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However, there are cases where one of the cause and eﬀect is an absence and the other is a
presence, and this strategy does not work. For example, suppose that failing to treat causes
a blood clot. That the cause is an absence precludes a mechanism here, but the eﬀect being
an absence precludes a mechanism in the obverse case, namely, administering the treat-
ment causes an absence of a blood clot.3
Now, establishing causality in these cases is not particularly problematic in practice.
However, it is more subtle than simply establishing both correlation and mechanism,
even where counterfactual correlations or mechanisms are admitted. The question as to
how RWT needs to be modiﬁed to say something useful in such cases will be not be con-
sidered here, because it is not central to the following arguments. The use of ‘normally’ is
intended to leave open the possibility that in certain cases of overdetermination or causa-
tion between absences one might not need to establish both correlation and mechanism.
1.2. Why the Thesis is True
Having clariﬁed the statement of the epistemological thesis RWT, let us turn to its
motivation.
To see why one ought to establish causality this way, consider that an observed corre-
lation between two variables might be explained in a wide variety of ways, as depicted in
Table 2. Some of these explanations provide reason to doubt that there is a genuine cor-
relation in the underlying population. For example, one of the potential confounders
might not have been adequately controlled for, or the sample may be rather small. On
the other hand, some of these explanations provide reason to doubt that A is a cause of
B, even where there is a genuine correlation between these variables. For example, there
might be some variable that could not possibly be considered a potential confounder,
given the evidence available, but nevertheless is a confounder, and has not been adequately
controlled for. In such a case A and B can be genuinely correlated yet Amay not be a cause
of B—the correlation is attributable to a common cause. Or there may be a genuine cor-
relation that is entirely non-causal, explained by a semantic relationship, for instance.
Thus there are two forms of error: error when inferring correlation in the data-generating
Table 2. Possible explanations of an observed correlation between A and B.
Causation A is a cause of B
Reverse causation B is a cause of A
Confounding (selection
bias)
There is some confounder C that has not been adequately controlled for by the study
Performance bias Those in the A-group are identiﬁed and treated diﬀerently to those in the ¬A-group
Detection bias B is measured diﬀerently in the A-group in comparison to the ¬A-group
Chance Sheer coincidence, attributable to too small a sample
Fishing Measuring so many outcomes that there is likely to be a chance correlation between A and
some such B
Temporal trends A and B both increase over time for independent reasons. E.g. prevalence of coeliac disease &
spread of HIV
Semantic relationships Overlapping meaning. E.g. phthiasis, consumption, scrofula (all of which refer to tuberculosis)
Constitutive relationships One variable is a part or component of the other
Logical relationships Measurable variables A and B are logically complex and logically overlapping. E.g. A is C ^ D
and B is D _ E
Physical laws E.g. conservation of total energy can induce a correlation between two energy measurements
Mathematical
relationships
E.g. mean and variance variables from the same distribution will often be correlated
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distribution from an observed correlation, and error when inferring that A is a cause of B
from an established correlation. Evidence of mechanisms can help to eliminate both forms
of error. For instance, it can help to determine the direction of causation, which variables
are potential confounders, whether a treatment regime is likely to lead to performance
bias, and whether measured variables are likely to exhibit temporal trends.4
The existence of the second kind of error—error when inferring that A is a cause of B
from an established correlation—shows that it is not enough to simply establish corre-
lation. If it is indeed the case that A is a cause of B, then there is some combination of
mechanisms that explains instances of B by invoking instances of A and which can
account for the correlation. Hence, in order to establish eﬃcacy one needs to establish
mechanism as well as correlation.5 This is enough to motivate RWT.
Let us consider an example. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
Monographs evaluate the carcinogenicity of various substances and environmental
exposures. When evaluating whether mobile phone use is a cause of cancer, IARC
found that the largest study (the INTERPHONE study) showed a correlation between
the highest levels of call time and certain cancers. This correlation was conﬁrmed by
another large study from Sweden. However, evidence of mechanisms was judged to be
weak overall, and certainly failed to establish the existence of an underlying mechanism.
For this reason, chance or bias was considered to be the most likely explanation of the
observed correlations, and while causality was not ruled out, neither was it established
(IARC 2013, §§5–6).
Further discussion of the descriptive and normative adequacy of RWT can be found in
the references provided at the start of this section. We will not revisit these arguments
here. Instead, I shall argue here that RWT provides a better account of the epistemology
of causality than a rival approach, namely the approach of present-day EBM. Let us now
consider this rival approach.
1.3. Why the Thesis is Controversial
One reason why the epistemological thesis RWT is controversial is that it conﬂicts with the
current practice of EBM.
EBM is concerned with making the evaluation of evidence explicit:
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evi-
dence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. (Sackett et al. 1996)
Of course, this goal is hardly controversial. What characterises present-day EBM is not
the goal itself but the means by which it attempts to achieve this goal. EBM employs hier-
archies of evidence in order to evaluate evidence and these hierarchies of evidence tend to
favour clinical studies and statistical analyses of these studies over other forms of evidence.
Clinical studies (CSs) measure the putative cause and eﬀect, together with potential con-
founders. CSs include controlled experiments such as randomised controlled trials (RCTs)
as well as observational studies such as cohort studies, case control studies, case series and
collections of case reports.
Non-CS evidence of mechanisms, i.e. evidence of mechanisms obtained by means other
than clinical studies, tends to be either ignored or relegated to the bottom of the hierarchy.
For example, Figure 3 depicts an evidence hierarchy of SUNY (2004), used for EBM
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training. This places animal research and in vitro research, which in the right circumstances
can provide high-quality evidence of mechanisms, below ‘opinions’, and well below evi-
dence obtained from clinical studies and statistical analyses of CSs. Figure 4 depicts the
current evidence hierarchy of the Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine, which
places ‘mechanism-based reasoning’ at the lowest level. Other approaches, such as the
GRADE system, tend to overlook non-CS evidence of mechanisms entirely (Guyatt et al.
2011, Fig. 2).
The main feature of contemporary EBM that is of relevance to this paper, then, is that it
views non-CS evidence of mechanisms as either irrelevant to the process of evidence
evaluation or as strictly inferior to evidence obtained from clinical studies and analyses
of CSs. In the latter case, opinions diﬀer as to whether or not clinical studies trump
non-CS evidence of mechanisms, i.e. whether or not one should ignore non-CS evidence
of mechanisms when clinical studies are available. Either way, however, clinical studies are
viewed as superior to other kinds of investigation that provide high-quality evidence of
mechanisms.
As a consequence, contemporary EBM stands in conﬂict with RWT. EBM prioritises
clinical studies over evidence of mechanism that arises from other sources. RWT, on
the other hand, treats all sources of evidence of mechanism equally.
Figure 5 represents the approachmotivated by RWT, as suggested by Clarke et al. (2014).
Evidence of correlation includes any evidence that is relevant to the claim that there is the
appropriate sort of correlation between the putative cause and eﬀect. Individual items of
such evidence are likely to vary in quality and in the direction to which they point, so
they need to be made explicit and evaluated in order to determine the extent to which
the body of evidence as a whole conﬁrms the correlation claim. Similarly, evidence ofmech-
anisms includes any evidence relevant to the claim that the putative cause and eﬀect are
linked in the appropriate way by a mechanism. This evidence needs to be made explicit
and evaluated to determine the extent to which it conﬁrms the mechanistic claim.
Finally, the extent to which evidence conﬁrms the causal claim of interest depends on the
extent to which it conﬁrms the correlation and mechanistic claims. In particular, RWT
says that if the evidence establishes both the latter claims then it establishes the causal claim.
Figure 3. SUNY Downstate Medical Center EBM Tutorial (SUNY 2004).
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Given the conﬂict between present-day EBM and RWT, and the fact that EBM is now
widely championed, it is no wonder that RWT is controversial. However, we shall see that
there are good reasons to prefer the RWT account of establishing causal claims to the
EBM-motivated view. Next, in section 2, I shall argue that RWT better explains the role
of clinical studies in establishing a causal claim. In section 3 I shall argue that RWT
better explains the process of extrapolating a causal claim from a source population to
a target population.
If these arguments are correct, present-day EBM fails to provide an adequate epistem-
ology of causality. However, this does not imply that the whole enterprise of EBM is
doomed. Current EBM provides a reasonable ﬁrst approximation to the correct epistem-
ology, and has led to numerous advances in patient care. The claim made here is that
improvements can be made to contemporary EBM, and that the picture of Figure 5 pro-
vides a better approximation. This picture can thus be viewed as a way to develop ‘EBM+’,
i.e. as a proposal to advance the methodology of EBM by taking better account of evidence
of mechanisms (cf. ebmplus.org (http://ebmplus.org)). The main ideas behind EBM+ are
(i) that it can be useful to explicitly scrutinise and evaluate all kinds of evidence of mech-
anisms, not just evidence arising from CSs (Table 1), and (ii) that this evidence needs to be
considered alongside evidence of correlation—rather than as inferior to it—in order to
establish eﬀectiveness in medicine, as per Figure 5.6 No claim is made that Figure 5 is
the end of the story; further improvements can be made, no doubt.
The RWT-motivated EBM+ approach is thus in line with the goal of EBM, as stated by
Sackett above, but not the practice of present-day EBM. While present-day EBM advances
an essentially monistic account of causal evaluation, in terms of CSs, the RWT-motivated
EBM+ approach is dualistic, treating evidence of mechanisms and evidence of correlation
separately, but on a par. In this sense, RWT and EBM+ have a close aﬃnity to the
approach of Austin Bradford Hill, in which causal claims are established by means of a
number of indicators, some of which provide good evidence of mechanisms and some
Figure 5. Treating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation, as motivated by RWT.
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of which provide good evidence of correlation (Hill 1965; Russo and Williamson 2007, §2;
Clarke et al. 2014, §2.2). This sort of dualist approach can perhaps be traced back another
century to Claude Bernard, who viewed it as essential to medicine in general:
Scientiﬁc, experimental medicine goes as far as possible in the study of vital phenomena; it
cannot limit itself to observing diseases or content itself with expectancy or stop at remedies
empirically given, but in addition it must study experimentally the mechanism of diseases
and the action of remedies. (Bernard 1865, 207)
2. Explananda Concerning Clinical Studies
In this section, I shall argue that RWT can successfully explain three fundamental facts
about the role of CSs in establishing a causal claim, and that the view motivated by
present-day EBM cannot account for all of these facts (although it can account for the
ﬁrst fact). The three facts are these: (i) in some cases, CSs suﬃce to establish a causal
claim; (ii) in some cases, randomised studies are not required to establish a causal
claim; (iii) in some cases, randomised studies are trumped by other evidence of mechan-
isms. We shall examine each of these facts in turn.
2.1. In Some Cases, Clinical Studies Suﬃce to Establish a Causal Claim
Howick (2011a) suggests that in a number of cases, medical interventions have been
accepted on the basis of comparative clinical studies alone. He cites the following cases:
the use of aspirin as an analgesic; the use of general anaesthesia; and the use of deep
brain stimulation in treating patients with advanced Parkinson’s disease or Tourette’s syn-
drome. He argues that these cases are a problem for the epistemological thesis RWT,
because the mechanisms of action were not—in some cases, still are not—known.
Howick points out that these cases are quite compatible with contemporary EBM,
which focuses overwhelmingly on clinical studies.
In response to this objection, one might question whether, in these examples, the causal
claims really were established on the basis of comparative clinical studies alone. Cases such
as aspirin and general anaesthesia pre-date EBM and their eﬀectiveness was arguably
established before they were tested in a systematic comparative clinical study. In all
cases, background knowledge was important and it is far from obvious that the causal
claims were established on the basis of comparative clinical studies alone.
However, I do not want to dwell on the particular examples here, because I want to
accept the general principle that it is possible that clinical studies alone can be used to
establish a causal claim in medicine. The point I want to make is that this general principle
is quite compatible with RWT.
Consider the RWT-motivated picture of Figure 5. Some of the total available evidence
can be considered to provide evidence of correlation, in the sense that these items of evi-
dence contribute to support or undermine the claim that the putative cause and eﬀect are
appropriately correlated. (An item of evidence contributes to support a claim if, when
taken together with other items, it supports the claim, and the other items do not on
their own support the claim to the same degree.) Some of the total available evidence
can be considered to provide evidence of mechanisms, in the sense that these items of evi-
dence contribute to support or undermine a claim that there is some mechanism which
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explains instances of the putative eﬀect in terms of the putative cause and which can
account for the extent of the correlation. There is no suggestion that an item of evidence
cannot provide both evidence of correlation and evidence of mechanisms.
In particular, clinical studies not only provide evidence of correlation, they can also—in
the right circumstances—provide high-quality evidence of mechanisms (Table 1). The
inference here can be represented as follows:
There are sufﬁciently many independent clinical studies
They are of sufﬁcient quality
Sufﬁciently many studies point in the same direction
They observe a large enough correlation
Fishing, temporal trends and non-causal relationships are ruled out
No other evidence suggests a lack of a suitable mechanism
There must be some underlying mechanism that explains the correlation
This inference can be understood as follows. Suppose that there are suﬃciently many
independent clinical studies that sample the study population in question, they are of
suﬃcient quality (e.g. they are suﬃciently large, well-conducted RCTs), suﬃciently
many studies point in the same direction, and they observe a large enough correlation
(aka ‘eﬀect size’). Here ‘suﬃciently’ is to be construed in such a way that the threshold
is reached for establishing a genuine correlation, and that bias and confounding are
ruled out as explanations of this correlation. Suppose further that available evidence
rules out ﬁshing, temporal trends and non-causal relationships such as semantic, consti-
tutive, logical, physical and mathematical relationships (cf. Table 2). Suppose, moreover,
that there is no other evidence against the existence of an underlying mechanism of action:
e.g. such a mechanism does not conﬂict with conﬁrmed theory. Then, by a process of elim-
ination, causation or reverse causation are the two remaining explanations (Table 2).
Either way, there must be some underlying mechanism linking the putative cause and
eﬀect that explains this correlation. (Note that this inference scheme is non-deductive;
there is no suggestion that the premisses guarantee the truth of the conclusions.)
In cases that satisfy the premisses of this inference, clinical studies can provide evidence
of the existence of a mechanism even though they may fail to shed light on the details of
the mechanism. If, in addition, temporal considerations rule out reverse causation, then
one can reach the conclusion that the putative cause is indeed the cause of the putative
eﬀect. Figure 6 depicts this kind of inference, from the perspective of RWT. In this
diagram, a thick arrow from node X to node Y signiﬁes that X on its own would suﬃce
to establish Y; a thin arrow is used if X is insuﬃcient on its own to establish Y, but never-
theless contributes to support Y.
In sum, then, while Howick cites as counterexamples to RWT cases in which clinical
studies have suﬃced to establish causality, any such cases are in fact quite compatible with
RWT. There are two separate distinctions at play here. The ﬁrst is the distinction between
evidence of correlation and evidence of mechanisms, which is invoked by RWT. The
second is the distinction between clinical studies and evidence obtained by other means,
which is central to present-day EBM. These distinctions do not coincide, and is only by erro-
neously conﬂating the two distinctions that one might think that instances of the above
12 J. WILLIAMSON
inference scheme refuteRWT:by erroneously assuming that clinical studies provide only evi-
dence of correlation and so inferring that RWT requires evidence obtained by other means.
RWT requires evidence of two diﬀerent kinds of connection—correlation andmechanism. It
does not require two diﬀerent kinds of evidence in the sense of requiring two independent
sources of evidence—clinical studies and non-CS evidence of mechanisms.7
While the above inference scheme is compatible with RWT, it is important to observe
that the conditions of the inference are very rarely met in practice. For example, instances
of this form of inference are very hard to ﬁnd in IARC evaluations: establishing the carci-
nogenicity of mists from strong inorganic acids may oﬀer one rare example (IARC 2012a,
487–495). Thus, although non-CS evidence of mechanisms is not always essential to estab-
lishing causality, it is typically an important part of an inference to cause.
Confusingly, Howick also cites as evidence against RWT a range of cases in which
evidence of mechanisms alone led to erroneous causal inferences; see also Howick
(2011b, chapter 10). These cases clearly conﬁrm—rather than disconﬁrm—RWT,
which says that causal claims cannot be established just by establishing mechanism
since one needs to establish correlation as well. Moreover, these cases also support
EBM+, which holds that evidence of mechanisms needs to made explicit and its
quality scrutinised. This is because in many of these cases the evidence of mechanisms
was rather weak.
2.2. In Some Cases, Randomised Studies are Not Required to Establish a Causal
Claim
The second key fact that needs to be explained by an account of establishing causal claims
in medicine is the fact that in some cases there is no need for RCTs when establishing caus-
ality. To see that this is so, consider three examples.
First, consider the tongue-in-cheek conclusions of Smith and Pell (2003), who study
‘parachute use to prevent death and major trauma related to gravitational challenge’:
As with many interventions intended to prevent ill health, the eﬀectiveness of parachutes has
not been subjected to rigorous evaluation by using randomised controlled trials. Advocates of
evidence based medicine have criticised the adoption of interventions evaluated by using only
Figure 6. Clinical studies can, in the right circumstances, establish a causal claim.
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observational data. We think that everyone might beneﬁt if the most radical protagonists of
evidence based medicine organised and participated in a double blind, randomised, placebo
controlled, crossover trial of the parachute. (Smith and Pell 2003, 1459)
From the point of view of contemporary EBM, the evidence for the eﬀectiveness of
parachutes is very weak: no systematic studies, let alone RCTs, and some mechanistic
evidence which sits at the bottom of the evidence hierarchy, if it features at all. It is
hard to see how causality could be established on the basis of this evidence, if
present-day EBM is right. From the point of view of EBM+, however, the evidence is
strong: excellent evidence of mechanisms, and, although unsystematic, plenty of obser-
vational evidence relating to instances where parachutes were and were not used, and a
very large observed eﬀect size. From the point of view of EBM+, the evidence of mech-
anisms on its own suﬃces to establish the existence of a suitable mechanism, and, when
combined with the unsystematic observations, the total evidence suﬃces to establish cor-
relation too. Hence causality is established. This inference is depicted in Figure 7.
(Again, the thick arrow signiﬁes that other evidence of mechanisms is suﬃcient to estab-
lish the existence of a mechanism.)
Having clariﬁed the structure of this inference, let us consider a second example (see
Worrall 2007). The question here is how to establish the eﬀectiveness of extracorporeal
membraneous oxygenation (ECMO) for treating persistent pulmonary hypertension
(PPHS). With PPHS, immaturity of the lungs in certain newborn babies leads to poor oxy-
genation of the blood. ECMO oxygenates the blood outside the body (Figure 8). Observa-
tional studies suggested that ECMO increases survival rate from about 20% to about 80%
(Bartlett et al. 1982). However, under standard EBM procedures for evaluating evidence,
the available evidence was viewed as insuﬃcient to establish causality, and it was felt
necessary to conduct an RCT (Bartlett et al. 1985). At least ﬁve subsequent RCTs were
carried out, leading to loss of life in the control groups.
Conducting RCTs in such a case is considered standard EBM procedure. That non-
RCT evidence is viewed as insuﬃcient by contemporary EBM was conﬁrmed by a
recent Cochrane Review of ECMO, which explicitly disregarded any evidence that did
not take the form of an RCT (Mugford, Elbourne, and Field 2010).
Figure 7. One way to establish a causal claim without RCTs.
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On the other hand, Worrall (2007) suggests that RCTs were unnecessary in the ECMO
case. This conclusion is supported by the RWT-motivated EBM+ approach. This case is
analogous to the parachute case: before the ﬁrst RCT there was strong observational evi-
dence which indicated a large eﬀect size, as well as excellent evidence of mechanisms.
Indeed, as in the parachute case, the details of the mechanism of action were very well
established. Thus Figure 7 captures the evidential situation in the ECMO case before
the ﬁrst RCT. There is little doubt that conducting RCTs led to yet greater surety;
however, despite being mandated by EBM, RCTs were arguably unnecessary to establish
causality.
As a third example, consider the case of establishing the carcinogenicity of aristolochic
acid. When IARC originally investigated aristolochic acid in 2002, it found that, while
there was observational evidence that Chinese herbs which contain aristolochic acid
cause cancer, there was ‘limited’ evidence in humans concerning the carcinogenicity of
aristolochic acid itself as an active ingredient, so carcinogenicity could not be established
(IARC 2002, 69–128). IARC re-examined the question some years later and found that
there was little in the way of further observational evidence in humans, so the study
Figure 8. The ECMO mechanism, as depicted by Bartlett et al. (1976).
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 15
evidence involving humans was still ‘limited’. However, there was much more evidence of
the underlying mechanisms available, to the extent that the mechanistic evidence could
now be described as ‘strong’ and causality could be considered established (IARC
2012b, 347–361). The key point here is that the change in evidence that warranted estab-
lishing causality was a change in evidence of the underlying mechanisms.
These three cases instantiate the following form of inference:
The mechanisms involved are established
Observational studies suggest a sufﬁciently large effect size
Sufﬁciently many studies point in the same direction
The mechanisms involved can clearly account for the effect size
Fishing, temporal trends and non-causal relationships are ruled out
No other evidence suggests a lack of a correlation
There is a genuine correlation
In these cases, evidence of mechanisms obtained by means other than clinical studies
provides evidence of correlation. When taken in conjunction with the observational
studies, this can be suﬃcient to establish a genuine correlation. This correlation, when
taken in conjunction with the established mechanism of action, can thereby establish cau-
sation (Figure 7). Note that the observational studies do not need to be very systematic:
this is so in the parachute example; it may also be true when establishing some adverse
drug reactions (Aronson and Hauben 2006; Hauben and Aronson 2007), and it is also
true of many interventions that pre-date EBM, such as the use of ileostomy surgery.
While this mode of inference clearly ﬁts the EBM+ approach, motivated by RWT, it is
harder for contemporary EBM to explain, because, as we saw in the ECMO case, much of
the practice of present-day EBM demands randomised studies in order to establish caus-
ality. To be sure, some deny that randomised trials are required. For example, Glasziou
et al. (2007) argue that in cases where there is a large eﬀect size, RCTs may be unnecessary.
However, they struggle to explain from within the EBM paradigm how evidence of mech-
anisms can be treated on a par with observational studies to help establish causality.
Instead they evoke Hill’s indicators of causality, and Hill’s approach is much more in
line with RWT and EBM+ than with contemporary EBM (see section 1.3).
2.3. In Some Cases, Randomised Studies are Trumped by Other Evidence of
Mechanisms
So far, we have seen that while present-day EBM can account for situations in which RCTs
are suﬃcient to establish causality, it is doubtful whether EBM adequately handles cases in
which RCTs are unnecessary. As we shall now see, it is clear that EBM cannot capture
cases in which randomised studies are trumped by other evidence of mechanisms. This
is because evidence of mechanisms obtained by means other than randomised studies is
viewed—when it is considered at all—as strictly inferior to evidence arising from random-
ised studies (section 1).
There are two kinds of example here. One sort of example involves positive evidence of
causality from randomised studies; this evidence is trumped by evidence that there is no
mechanism by which causality can operate. To start with another tongue-in-cheek
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example, Leibovici (2001) presented an RCT which observed a correlation between
remote, retroactive intercessionary prayer and length of stay of patients in hospital. The
patients in question had bloodstream infections in Israel during the period 1990–1996;
the intervention involved saying ‘a short prayer for the well being and full recovery of
the group as a whole’ in the year 2000 in the USA, long after recovery or otherwise actually
took place. The study also found a correlation between the intervention and duration of
fever. The author concludes:
No mechanism known today can account for the eﬀects of remote, retroactive intercessory
prayer said for a group of patients with a bloodstream infection. However, the signiﬁcant
results and the ﬂawless design prove that an eﬀect was achieved. (Leibovici 2001, 1451)
Present-day EBM clearly accords with this inference to an eﬀect, because it views con-
siderations to do with mechanisms as strictly inferior to evidence produced by clinical
studies. However, the implicit conclusion is that this line of reasoning is ridiculous: no
eﬀect should be inferred. This contrary conclusion goes against EBM. It is not possible
for present-day EBM to account for the possibility that a large, well-conducted RCT can
be trumped by the fact that current science has no place for a mechanism between
remote, retroactive intercessionary prayer and length of stay of in hospital. On the other
hand, this is quite compatible with EBM+. Figure 9 depicts the inference here, from the per-
spective of RWT.Undermining evidence is represented by dashed arrows. The thick dashed
arrow depicts an inferential connection that is enough on its own to rule out a mechanism.
As before, the thick solid arrow depicts a connection that would normally be enough on its
own to establish the conclusion (correlation): a signiﬁcant result from a large well-con-
ducted RCT. However, there is evidence which undermines this conclusion: well-
conﬁrmed scientiﬁc theory. The presence of this undermining evidence blocks any infer-
ence to either correlation or mechanism, and thereby blocks an inference to causation.
Other inferences follow the same pattern. Some comparative studies for precognition
have observed a signiﬁcant correlation (see, e.g. Bem 2011), as have others in the case
of homeopathy (e.g. Cucherat et al. 2000; Faculty of Homeopathy 2016). What are the
options for resisting an inference to causality in such cases? EBM will point to the fact
Figure 9. Evidence of a lack of mechanism can trump RCTs.
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that the evidence base shows mixed results and is thus inconclusive. However, while this
may be so for precognition and homeopathy in general, it is not the case for certain speciﬁc
interventions which are instances of precognition or homeopathy; as the above references
show, there are speciﬁc interventions for which only positive studies are available. A
second possible way to resist an inference to causality in such cases is to invoke the
machinery of Bayesianism: to argue that the prior probability of eﬀectiveness is so low
that the posterior probability remains low, despite conﬁrmatory trials. This strategy is
open to the charge of subjectivity. Clearly, the proponent of a subjective Bayesian analysis
will have to admit that the choice of prior is subjective here. But even objective Bayesian
analyses typically require a high prior probability of deception or experimental error
(Jaynes 2003, §§5.1–2), and detractors can take issue with this presumption. A third
alternative is to apply the RWT-motivated EBM+ approach. According to RWT, the infer-
ence in these cases follows the pattern of Figure 9, and it is clear that causality has not been
established, even in speciﬁc cases where trials would be suﬃcient in the absence of other
evidence to establish correlation. Arguably, then, the RWT-motivated approach is the
most promising of these three strategies.
In the kind of example considered above, positive evidence from randomised studies is
trumped by evidence of absence of mechanism. But there is another sort of example, in
which there is observational evidence, evidence from RCTs and other positive evidence
of mechanisms, and in which the other evidence of mechanisms plays more of a role in
establishing causality than do the RCTs. The ECMO case takes this form at the point
after the ﬁrst randomised trial. The ﬁrst randomised trial provided weak evidence,
because after the ﬁrst baby was randomly assigned to the control arm of the trial and sub-
sequently died, no more individuals were assigned to this arm. Thus the size of the trial was
not suﬃcient to draw any strong conclusions. Arguably, at that point in time the evidence of
mechanisms was stronger than the evidence arising from RCTs and it playedmore of a role
in establishing causality. Indeed, if the analysis of section 2.2 is correct then the RCT evi-
dencewas redundant. The evidence ofmechanisms trumps the RCT evidence in such a case.
2.4. Summary
To conclude, the causal epistemology motivated by RWT can validate all three facts about
the role of clinical studies in establishing a causal claim. The EBM approach certainly cap-
tures the ﬁrst fact (in some cases, clinical studies suﬃce to establish a causal claim).
However, the practice of EBM goes against the second fact (in some cases, randomised
studies are not required to establish a causal claim) and EBM certainly fails to explain
the third fact (in some cases, randomised studies are trumped by other evidence of
mechanisms).
The proponent of present-day EBMmight object that one should not infer a normative
thesis about appropriate methodology from a description of actual practice—i.e. from the
three facts about the role of clinical studies in actual instances of causal discovery. It is no
doubt true that some actual instances of causal discovery were methodologically ﬂawed,
and that in some cases researchers thought that they had established a causal claim when
in fact they had failed to establish it. Thus one must be cautious when generalising from
actual instances to normative claims. However, it is also beyond doubt that—in recent
times—medicine has successfully discovered a great number of causal claims. Methods
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employed in actual medical examples work, by-and-large, and so they tell us something
about appropriate methodology. Given this, the three facts do indeed admit a normative
interpretation. It is thus incumbent upon the proponent of EBMwho denies the normative
interpretation of one (or more) of these facts to explain away all the apparent instances of
causal discovery which seem to support it. Each of the three facts considered above, under a
normative reading, says only that in some cases certainmethods are appropriate, so in order
to deny one of these facts the onus is on the proponent of present-day EBM to show that in
all cases the corresponding methods are inappropriate.
3. Extrapolation
3.1. Three Approaches to Extrapolation
Wenow turn to the question of how a causal claim can be extrapolated from a source popu-
lation to a target population of interest. This mode of inference is ubiquitous, because the
population within which a typical clinical study establishes a correlation (e.g. hospital
patients in a particular region who are not too young, not too old, not too ill and not preg-
nant) is almost never the same as the population within which the treatment is intended to
be used. It is also very common—and particularly challenging—to extrapolate causal claims
from animals to humans. Any adequate causal epistemology needs to explain how extrapol-
ation is possible and needs to clarify the logic of extrapolation.
Here is a ﬁrst approximation to the logic of extrapolation:
The causal relationship holds in the source population
The source and target populations are similar in causally relevant respects
The causal relationship holds in the target population
As Steel (2008) points out, this explication faces two immediate problems. The ﬁrst,
which Steel calls the extrapolator’s circle, is that ‘it needs to be explained how we could
know that the model and the target are similar in causally relevant respects without
already knowing the causal relationship in the target’ (78). The worry is that extrapolation
seems redundant since the conclusion of the above rule of inference is apparently needed
to establish the second premiss. The second problem, which we shall call the extrapolator’s
block, is that ‘any adequate account of extrapolation in heterogeneous populations must
explain how extrapolation can be possible even when [causally relevant diﬀerences
between the model and the target] are present’ (78–79). That is, the source and target
population are rarely entirely similar in all causally relevant respects—particularly when
extrapolating from animals to humans—and it needs to be made clear what sort of diﬀer-
ences are permissible in order to prevent the second premiss of the above argument from
failing and the inference thereby being blocked. Thanks to these two problems, this ﬁrst
attempt at a logic of extrapolation fails, and we must look further aﬁeld.
Note that a source population is chosen for investigation precisely because one can
conduct more conclusive clinical studies on this population than on the target population.
Thus the clinical studies that one can perform on the source population—typically, exper-
imental studies—tend to be of a higher standard than those—typically, observational studies
—which are directly obtained on the target population. Indeed, there would be no point
extrapolating from source to target if the studies in the source population were less
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conclusive than those conducted on the target population. In the light of this point, one can
sketch an approach to extrapolation motivated by contemporary EBM as follows:
High quality CSs establish a causal relationship in the source population
Lower quality CSs in the target population are consistent with this relationship
The causal relationship holds in the target population
This approach to extrapolation circumvents the aforementioned two problems very
nicely. There is no extrapolator’s circle because one does not need to know that the
causal relationship holds in the target population to obtain observational studies in the
target population. There is no extrapolator’s block because this theory of extrapolation
makes extrapolation possible even when there are substantial diﬀerences between the
source and target populations.
That there may be substantial diﬀerences between the source and target populations
points to two new problems that face the EBM-motivated approach. First, we have
what we might call the extrapolator’s fallacy: it needs to be explained how extrapolation
is a reliable form of inference, rather than simply fallacious. The worry is that the
EBM-motivated account will lead to lots of mistaken conclusions, because lower quality
CSs in the target population, such as observational studies, typically provide weak evidence
that the target population is similar to the source population in causally relevant respects.
This problem may explain some recent scepticism about extrapolation amongst those
interested in medical methodology (see, e.g. Ioannidis 2012). However, since almost
every causal claim of interest has to be extrapolated from some source population, falla-
cious extrapolation is hardly a viable option.
The second, related problem is that the extrapolator’s standards are slipping. In the EBM-
motivated approach, there is a high standard for internal validity but a low standard for exter-
nal validity: evidence deemed to be of high quality by EBM (such as that obtained fromRCTs)
is used to establish causality in a source population, while lower quality evidence (such as that
obtained from observational studies) is used to establish causality in the target population. In
general, an account of extrapolation should not have double standards—the burden of proof
for causality should be similar in the source and target populations.
As Steel (2008, chapter 5) suggests, in order to extrapolate a causal claim from a source
population to a target population, one needs evidence that similar mechanisms operate in
the two populations.8 This is particularly important in contexts where mechanisms are
likely to diﬀer, such as with extrapolations from animals to humans, or interventions
involving long causal pathways. It turns out that this feature of extrapolation can be cap-
tured by the following RWT-motivated account.
Figure 10 depicts an account of the logic of extrapolation that is motivated by RWT. In
the source population, one can carry out clinical studies that normally cannot be carried
out in the target population; these studies are often enough on their own to establish cor-
relation. By also establishing mechanism, one can then establish causality in the source
population. Let us turn to the target population. Clinical studies conducted on the
target population, even when augmented by other evidence of the mechanisms of the
target population, are insuﬃcient to establish both correlation and mechanism—otherwise
there would be no need for extrapolation. Extrapolation is possible when evidence of
mechanisms in the target population is strong enough not only to establish the existence
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of a suitable mechanism M′ in the target population, but also to establish that this mech-
anism is similar in key respects to the mechanismM inferred in the source population. The
expression M′ ; M in Figure 10 denotes this similarity claim. By means of this similarity
of mechanisms, one can use the claim that A is a cause of B established in the source popu-
lation to further support the correlation claim in the target population. In sum, where
clinical studies and other mechanistic investigations in the target population are not
jointly suﬃcient to establish correlation in the target, if the corresponding causal claim
is established in the source population and it is also established that the mechanisms in
the target population are suﬃciently similar to those which underpin causation in the
source population then this combination of evidence may be enough to establish corre-
lation in the target population. If so, since mechanism in the target is also established,
causality can be inferred.
As an extreme case, there may be no clinical studies in the target population; this in
itself does not preclude extrapolation under the RWT-motivated account. For example,
when IARC evaluated the carcinogenicity of benzo[a]pyrene, they found no human
studies measuring exposure to benzo[a]pyrene together with relevant cancer outcomes.
However, there were excellent animal studies and enough evidence of mechanisms in
animals to establish carcinogenicity in the relevant animal models and to determine the
details of the mechanism of action there. Furthermore, there was excellent evidence
that the human mechanisms were similar to the mechanisms found in animals. This
was considered enough to establish carcinogenicity in humans (IARC 2012a, 111–144).
Note that this inference is not validated by the EBM-motivated account of extrapolation
provided above, because there were no relevant clinical studies in humans. Thus the
example favours the RWT-motivated account of extrapolation.
To take another case where there were no clinical studies in the target population, con-
sider the IARC evaluation of d-Limonene as a cause of cancer. In this case too, there were
no studies available in humans. Carcinogenicity of d-Limonene was established in male
rats, so this seemed to be a candidate for extrapolation. However, there were crucial dis-
similarities between the mechanism of action in rats and the corresponding human
Figure 10. The logic of extrapolation as motivated by RWT.
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mechanisms: in particular, a protein responsible for nephrotoxicity in male rats is speciﬁc
to male rats. Thus no extrapolation was possible and carcinogenicity was not established
(IARC 1999b, 317–327). This example, which is also in accord with the RWT-motivated
account, shows how crucial it is to establish similarity of mechanisms.
Determining similarity of mechanisms can be rather tortuous. With regard to the
question of the carcinogenicity of Di(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP), causality was
established in animals by 1982. In 2000, however, IARC downgraded its carcinogenicity
rating in humans—to some controversy (Huﬀ 2003)—because new evidence suggested
that ‘DEHP caused liver tumours in rats and mice by a non-DNA-reactive mechanism
involving peroxisome proliferation, which was considered not relevant to humans’
(Grosse et al. 2011, 329). In 2011, a third IARC working group had substantially
more mechanistic evidence available, and this evidence suggested that there are other
pathways in the cancer mechanism, some of which are relevant to humans. This led
to the carcinogenicity rating to be upgraded again (Grosse et al. 2011). That the evalu-
ation of carcinogenicity tracks evidence of mechanistic similarity simply cannot be
explained by present-day EBM.
In some cases, new clinical studies in the target population can lead to a re-evalu-
ation of a mechanistic similarity claim. IARC ﬁrst examined acrylonitrile in 1979
(IARC 1979, 73–86), and in 1987 decided that carcinogenicity in rats was established
and carcinogenicity in humans was likely (IARC 1987, 79–80). Carcinogenicity was
not considered to be established in humans because studies in humans provided
limited evidence of correlation and other evidence of similarity of mechanisms
between rats and humans was also limited. Nevertheless, similarity of mechanisms
was credible enough for carcinogenicity in humans to be considered likely. By 1999,
further studies in humans had suggested that earlier observed correlations were prob-
ably due to confounding by smoking (IARC 1999a, 43–108). These studies cast doubt
both on correlation and on similarity of mechanisms and led to a downgrading of the
likelihood of carcinogenicity.
It is important to note that demonstrating mechanistic similarity requires showing that
the whole structure of relevant mechanisms is suﬃciently similar, not just that the mech-
anism M by which causality operates in the source population has an analogue in the
target population. Thus, one needs to establish that any new counteracting mechanism
in the target population is not so signiﬁcant that it can cancel out (‘mask’) the action of
the analogue of M. This masking problem was a stumbling block for Anitschkow when
he tried to establish that dietary cholesterol causes atherosclerosis by appealing to
animal experiments (Anitschkow 1933). He provided compelling evidence that the
causal relationship holds in rabbits and that the mechanism responsible for this relation-
ship also occurs in humans. However, various non-herbivorous animals, including rats,
did not exhibit the correlation between dietary cholesterol and atherosclerosis that was
found in rabbits. This lack of robustness suggests the presence of a counteracting mech-
anism in certain non-herbivorous species which masks the action of the positive mechan-
ism of action that was found in rabbits. The presence of such a masking mechanism in
humans would count as an important diﬀerence between the relevant mechanistic struc-
tures in rabbits and humans. Thus, similarity of mechanisms was not established, and cau-
sation in humans was rightly not considered established by Anitschkow’s work (see
Parkkinen 2016).
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3.2. The Four Problems for Extrapolation
We shall now see that this RWT-motivated account of extrapolation survives the four pro-
blems for extrapolation identiﬁed above.
First, let us consider the extrapolator’s circle. That there is no circle should be apparent
from the fact that Figure 10 is acyclic: one does not need to have already established causality
in the target population in order to meet any of the requirements for establishing causality.
Of course, once these requirements are all met, causality in the target is thereby established,
but there is no inferential circle here. See Steel (2008, §5.4.2) for further discussion of how
mechanism-based approaches can avoid the extrapolator’s circle.
Turning next to the extrapolator’s block, one might worry that we are lacking an
account of how extrapolation is possible when mechanisms in the source and target popu-
lations are not identical. Similarity of mechanisms is a matter of degree, and the more
similar the mechanisms, the more that causation in the source population conﬁrms cor-
relation in the target population. Steel (2008, §5.3.2) discusses this question and presents
comparative process tracing as a method for establishing similarity:
First, learn the mechanism in the model organism, by means of process tracing or other
experimental means. For example, a description of a carcinogenic mechanism would indicate
such things as the product of the phase I metabolism and the enzymes involved; whether the
metabolite is a mutagen, an indication of how it alters DNA; and so on. Second, compare
stages of the mechanism in the model organism with that of the target organism in which
the two are most likely to diﬀer signiﬁcantly. For example, one would want to know
whether the chemical is metabolized by the same enzymes in the two species, and whether
the same metabolite results, and so forth. In general, the greater the similarity of conﬁgur-
ation and behavior of entities involved in the mechanism at these key stages, the stronger
the basis for the extrapolation. (Steel 2008, 89)
In fact, comparative process tracing is but one of several methods for establishing simi-
larity of mechanisms. One can also establish similarity of mechanisms without determin-
ing the details of the mechanisms M and M′, by employing phylogenetic reasoning,
robustness analysis or even enumerative induction (Parkkinen and Williamson 2017,
§4). Thus there is a portfolio of methods for overcoming the extrapolator’s block.
Let us consider the extrapolator’s fallacy next. Unlike the EBM-motivated approach, the
RWT-motivated analysis of extrapolation requires evidence that ensures that the source and
target populations are similar in causally relevant respects. Mechanistic evidence plays a key
role here, in ensuring that M′ ; M. By being more demanding than the EBM-motivated
approach in terms of the evidence required in the target population, extrapolation promises
to be more reliable under the RWT account than under the EBM account.
Finally, we can ask whether the extrapolator’s standards are slipping. That this is not
the case is apparent from Figure 10: the inferential requirements—establishing correlation
and mechanism—are the same in both the source and target populations. If anything, one
might one worry that the standards of evidence are higher in the target population than in
the study population since Figure 10 includes the extra requirement of establishing simi-
larity of mechanism there. However, this is just an artefact of the diagram. Similarity of
mechanisms concerns the relation between the source and target populations, not just
the target population. Therefore, there is a genuine symmetry between what is required
of the source and target populations.
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That the RWT account of extrapolation overcomes the latter two problems, while the
EBM approach does not, speaks in favour of the RWT approach and against the EBM
approach.
3.3. Criticisms of Mechanistic Accounts of Extrapolation
Having developed the RWT-motivated theory of extrapolation, we shall now consider
some criticisms of mechanistic accounts of extrapolation in the light of this theory.
Guala (2010, §6) suggests that there are cases of extrapolation that do not proceed via
comparative process tracing. Guala develops an example involving outer continental shelf
auctions, which are used to sell oil leases in the Gulf of Mexico, to show that it is not always
necessary to determine the details of the relevant mechanisms, as would be required by
comparative process tracing. As noted above, however, the RWT-motivated account
sees comparative process tracing as but one of several strategies for establishing similarity
of mechanisms, and Guala’s case is perfectly in accord with this. What is important to the
RWT account is the inferential step M′ ; M: strategies for extrapolation seek to demon-
strate similarity of mechanisms. As Guala notes,
This clearly falls short of a proper articulation of the mechanism … And yet, it is perfectly
adequate for extrapolation purposes. Large parts of the mechanism can be “black boxed”
as long as there are good reasons to believe that they are analogously instantiated in the lab-
oratory and target system’. (Guala 2010, 1080)
One of the advantages of the RWT-motivated approach, then, is that by situating extra-
polation in the inference scheme depicted in Figure 10 it covers much a broader range of
scenarios than comparative process tracing does.
Howick, Glasziou, and Aronson (2013a, 2013b) are broadly sceptical of mechanism-
based extrapolation. They identify several problems for basing extrapolations on mechan-
istic evidence. First, our understanding of mechanisms is often incomplete. In response
one can note that this is of course true, but insuﬃcient knowledge of the details of M
and M′ for comparative process tracing does not always preclude establishing that
M′ ; M: one can often employ the other strategies mentioned above. Second, knowledge
of mechanisms is not always applicable outside the tightly controlled laboratory con-
ditions in which is gained. This is also true, but it is symptomatic of science in general:
whatever approach one takes, one must make sure that one’s conclusions are robust
enough to extend to the application of interest. In particular, an EBM-motivated approach
has to ensure that conclusions based on trials with strict exclusion criteria are transport-
able to the population to be treated. The third problem that they identify is that mechan-
isms can behave ‘paradoxically’, e.g. a drug can have opposite eﬀects in diﬀerent contexts.
In response, observe that it is only by understanding the underlying mechanisms that one
can explain these paradoxical eﬀects and improve treatment. Moreover, clinical studies are
crucial for identifying the presence of such eﬀects. All this conﬁrms the RWT-motivated
account of extrapolation, which takes both clinical studies and non-CS evidence of mech-
anisms seriously. The fourth problem that Howick et al. pick out is the extrapolator’s
circle. Their worry is that the evidence of the target population required to establish
that M′ ; M makes the evidence on the source population redundant. As Figure 10
makes clear, this need not be the case: one can establish that M′ ; M in the absence of
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evidence from clinical studies in the target population that would one their own be
suﬃcient to establish causality. Howick et al. might respond by noting that under the
EBM-motivated account of extrapolation, only weak evidence of the target population
is required to establish causality in the target population and this evidence would be
suﬃcient to establish causality there. However, as discussed above, this is a problem for
the EBM-motivated account: it makes extrapolation too easy to be entirely credible—it
is subject to the extrapolator’s fallacy. That the RWT-motivated theory of extrapolation
is more demanding in terms of the evidence required for extrapolation is an advantage
over the EBM-motivated account.
4. Conclusion
We have seen that the epistemological thesis RWT motivates a view of medical method-
ology that stands in conﬂict with contemporary EBM. Although there is a tension between
RWT and EBM, I have argued that RWT can better explain three key features of the use of
CSs to establish causality, and that it yields a better account of extrapolation. Thus, I con-
clude that RWT and EBM+ oﬀer a promising way forward in the controversy as to how
best to improve EBM.
The EBM approach to causal inference has in recent years extended well beyond medi-
cine, to public policy making and various areas of the social sciences, for example. While
this paper has focussed on medicine, RWT can be interpreted as having a broader range of
application, and similar conclusions to those drawn in this paper may apply beyond medi-
cine. The broader scope of these conclusions is left as a question for further research.
Notes
1. To take an extreme example of the importance of organisation, a chimney mechanism is
responsible for the extraction of smoke purely in virtue of its spatial organisation. No activi-
ties constitute the chimney mechanism itself—although smoke actively passes through the
mechanism—and the only relevant properties of the entities that constitute the mechanism
(e.g. bricks and mortar) are structural properties to do with their impermeability and their
ability to support the load of the chimney. Kaiser (2016) provides further evidence for the
claim that a mechanism cannot always be identiﬁed with a causal network.
2. ‘Correlated’ is often used in weaker senses, e.g. meaning unconditionally probabilistically
dependent, or unconditionally linearly dependent. Certain arguments of this paper also go
through under these weaker interpretations of ‘correlated’: if, under a strong reading of ‘cor-
relation’, it is not enough simply to establish correlation in order to establish causation, then
that is also true under a weak reading.
3. Cases of disconnection (Schaﬀer 2000) or double-prevention (Hall 2004) may also be thought
of as cases that involve absences.
4. Evidence of mechanisms can help in other respects too. For example, evidence of mechanisms
is often essential in order to properly design a CS or interpret its results (Clarke et al. 2014).
5. These assertions hold ‘normally’, i.e. modulo the qualiﬁcations about underdetermination
and causation between absences discussed above.
6. One might think that it would be very diﬃcult to systematically consider evidence of mech-
anisms alongside evidence of correlation. However, as Parkkinen et al. (2018) show, this is
not the case. They put forward procedures for evaluating non-CS evidence of mechanisms
and for combining this evaluation with a standard evaluation of CSs in order to provide
an overall assessment of a causal claim.
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7. This point was emphasised by Illari (2011, §2). One might think that, by not requiring two
diﬀerent sources of evidence, RWT somehow becomes trivially true, or that it becomes com-
patible in general with present-day EBM. Subsequent sections of this paper show that this is
not so, by highlighting points of disagreement with present-day EBM and arguing that these
points of disagreement favour RWT.
8. Cartwright (2011) is another proponent of the view that successful extrapolation requires evi-
dence that goes beyond statistical studies.
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